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MORE THAN THEY BARGAINED FOR: ARE
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES LIABLE
IN TORT FOR UNDISCLOSED
TITLE DEFECTS?
James Bruce Davis*
Title insurance has become the prevailing method by which real estate
purchasers and mortgage lenders protect themselves against the risk of
defects in their titles.' Title insurance policies typically provide that the
title insurance company will indemnify the insured owner or lender for
loss or damage caused by a title defect that existed on the date of his
policy, unless the defect was excluded from policy coverage. If the title
insurance company fails to perform its obligations under the policy, the
insured may recover his loss from the company in an action for breach of
contract.2
This Article explores the question of whether insured owners and lend-
ers may also recover in tort from a title insurance company for title de-
fects it failed to disclose in a title insurance policy. The cases addressing
this question have split into two opposing branches over the past twenty
years, with the authorities more or less evenly divided.3 One line of cases
holds that the title insurance policy's terms and conditions provide the
insured's exclusive remedy against his title insurance company for an un-
* James Bruce Davis is an attorney and shareholder with the law firm of Bean, Kin-
ney & Korman, P.C., 2000 N. 14th Street, Suite 100, Arlington, VA 22201. He specializes
in title insurance law, with an emphasis on policy coverage. The author expresses his ap-
preciation to James B. DeWeese for reviewing a prior draft of this Article and providing
helpful suggestions. The author also thanks Dannon G. Williams for her assistance in the
research for this Article.
1. D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE §. 1.1.2, at 1:7 (2d ed. 1993)
("By the end of World War II, title insurance was the predominant (in number of transac-
tions) form of title assurance in the country."); see also Joyce Dickey Palomar, Title Insur-
ance Companies' Liability for Failure to Search Title and Disclose Record Title, 20
CREIGHTON L. REV. 455, 457 (1987) (noting that the increased demand for title insurance
stemmed from the inadequacy of alternative protections).
2. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.14, at 873 (2d
ed. 1993) (stating that the "title insurance policy is a contract of indemnity").
3. See Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 217 (N.J. 1989)
(noting this division of authority).
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disclosed title defect.4 The alternative line of cases holds that a title in-
surance company has an implied duty to search public records for title
defects, that it may be held liable for negligently performing that duty,
and that contractual disclaimers of tort liability are void.5
The issue of tort liability usually arises when a property owner or mort-
gage lender discovers a title defect that his policy did not disclose, and
becomes dissatisfied with his remedies under the policy.6 Insured owners
4. See, e.g., Southland Title Corp. v. Superior Court, 282 Cal. Rptr. 425, 428-29 (Cal.
Ct. App.) (holding that a title insurance company is not subject to liability in tort based on
the issuance of a preliminary report), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4321 (Cal. 1991);
Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. of Idaho, 764 P.2d 423, 425-27 (Idaho
1988) (finding insurer free from tort liability because it only assumed a duty to insure);
Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 82, 86 (Idaho 1982) (imposing no duty to search on the
title insurance company even though it provided a preliminary title report); W.E. Erickson
Constr., Inc. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 861, 865 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (enforcing
the ALTA Commitment Form's exclusive remedy clause by relying on the principle that
"[ain exclusive remedy clause will be enforced unless it violates public policy, or something
in the social relationship of the parties works against upholding the clause") (citing Harris
v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 917 (III. 1988)); Walker Rogge, 562 A.2d at 218-20 (defining the title
company's relationship to the insured as purely contractual); Horn v. Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp., 557 P.2d 206, 208 (N.M. 1976) (holding that the title insurance company has no
contractual duty to perform a search of the public records because no such duty was im-
posed by the language of the policy) (superceded by statutory tort remedy as stated in Ruiz
v. Garcia, 850 P.2d 972 (N.M. 1993)); Citibank, N.A. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 632 N.Y.S.2d
779, 784 (App. Div. 1995); Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah
1990) (holding that the title company is not liable as an abstractor when it issues a commit-
ment or policy); Greenberg v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 492 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Wis. 1992)
(ruling that a title insurance company has no duty to search the public records when it
issues a commitment for title insurance).
5. See, e.g., Parker v. Ward, 614 So. 2d 975, 978 (Ala. 1992) (finding that the title
insurance company had a "contractual obligation" and a "common law duty" to search the
public records); Bank of Cal., N.A. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1126, 1129-30
(Alaska 1992) (holding a title insurance company liable for negligent misrepresentation);
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (recog-
nizing an insured's ability to recover damages for emotional distress caused by company's
negligent failure to disclose a title defect) (overruled by statute as stated in Southland Title
Corp. v. Superior Court, 282 Cal. Rptr. 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)); Shada v. Title & Trust
Co. of Fla., 457 So. 2d 553, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (treating the title company as an
abstractor with a duty to use reasonable care), review denied, 464 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1985);
Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., 553 P.2d 254, 269-70 (Kan. 1976) (imposing liabil-
ity for punitive damages on the title insurance company); Malinak v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.
of Idaho, 661 P.2d 12, 16 (Mont. 1983) (holding that a title insurance company's failure to
conduct a reasonably diligent search would constitute actionable negligence); Heyd v. Chi-
cago Title Ins. Co., 354 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Neb. 1984) (holding that the policy provision
limiting claims to the policy agreement does not prohibit a negligence action).
6. See Malinak, 661 P.2d at 14 (recognizing insured's ability in tort action to seek
damages for travel costs, attorney fees, and other expenses). Note also that if the insured
viewed his remedies under the policy as adequate, he would most likely pursue the no-fault
contractual remedy available under the policy rather than taking on the burden of proving
that the insurer was guilty of negligence or some other fault that would give rise to tort
liability.
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and lenders may wish to recover damages that the policy does not cover,
such as damages exceeding the policy amount,7 damages for emotional
distress,8 punitive damages,9 damages for making a loan on which the
borrower subsequently defaults, 10 or damages for purchasing property
that the buyer otherwise would not have purchased if he had known the
true status of the title.1
Dissatisfaction with policy remedies also may arise when the title insur-
ance company requires the insured to defer his claim until the company
exercises its contractual right to cure the title defect.12 Delays and uncer-
tainties of litigation may inflict very real damages upon the insured, even
if the defect ultimately is cured.13 Those damages may not be recover-
able under the policy, however, because policies often preclude claims
7. See, e.g., Parker, 614 So. 2d at 978 (noting that some authorities argue that tort
recovery need not be limited by the policy amount). But see Southland Title Corp., 282
Cal. Rptr. at 429-30 (ruling that the policy controlled the company's liability where the
insured sued in tort because his damages exceeded the policy amount).
8. See, e.g., Jarchow, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
9. See Ford, 553 P.2d at 270.
10. See, e.g., Focus Inv. Assocs., Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 1231, 1234
(1st Cir. 1993). A mortgage lender sued its title insurance company for damages associated
with a failed mortgage loan transaction. Id. The lender was insured as having a second
mortgage on two parcels of property, but later discovered that it actually had only a fifth
lien on the first parcel and a fourth lien on the second. Id. at 1233-34. Notwithstanding the
undisclosed prior liens, the lender sustained no loss under the policy because the value of
the security property was insufficient to pay any liens beyond the first mortgage. Id. at
1234. Claiming that the title company had committed the tort of negligent misrepresenta-
tion, the lender sued for the full amount of its loan, which had gone into default, on the
theory that the lender would not have made the loan knowing the true status of title. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, applying Rhode Island law, found
no basis for the claim of negligent misrepresentation because the title insurance policy was
not a representation of the status of title, but solely a contract of indemnity. Id. at 1237.
For a similar case, with a similar outcome, see Citibank, N.A. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 632
N.Y.S.2d 1779 (App. Div. 1995).
11. Soutullo v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 646 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Ala. 1994).
12. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION, POLICY FORMS HANDBOOK 1992
Loan Policy, § 11-1, at I 4(b) (1994) [hereinafter 1992 Loan Policy]. This policy contains
the following as an example of a right to cure clause:
The Company shall have the right, at its own cost, to institute and prosecute
any action or proceeding or to do any other act which in its opinion may be neces-
sary or desirable to establish the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the
insured mortgage, as insured, or to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the in-
sured. The Company may take any appropriate action under the terms of this
policy, whether or not it shall be liable hereunder, and shall not thereby concede
liability or waive any provision of this policy. If the Company shall exercise its
rights under this paragraph, it shall do so diligently.
Id.; see also id. 1992 Owner's Policy, § 11-2, at J 4(b) (containing a similar provision) [here-
inafter 1992 Owner's Policy].
13. See Bank of Cal., N.A. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1126, 1131 (Alaska
1992) (prohibiting an insured from filing any contract claim under a title insurance policy
19951
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where the title insurance company succeeds within a reasonable time in
establishing title to the real estate as insured.' 4
Tort actions, where permitted, may enable the insured to recover dam-
ages outside the scope of the policy or to bring an action immediately
upon the discovery of a title defect, without waiting for the title insurance
company to cure the defect. In these actions, plaintiffs typically allege
that the company acted negligently in searching the title, that it misrepre-
sented the condition of title, that it breached a fiduciary duty to the in-
sured, or that it committed a deceptive trade practice.' 5
This Article embraces the position that a title insurance company's
duty to its insured is contractual and that the company has no express or
implied contractual duty to search public records when it issues a title
insurance commitment or policy. This Article also asserts that a title in-
surance company generally is not liable in tort if the commitment or pol-
icy fails to disclose title defects, and that the insured's remedies for
undisclosed title defects are limited to the remedies provided by the
policy.
This limited liability view does not preclude tort liability if the title in-
surance company engages in conduct that constitutes an independent tort
against the insured. If the company agrees to provide the insured with an
abstract of the public records, the company could be liable to its customer
for damages it caused by negligently conducting a record search.' 6 Simi-
larly, if the company serves as settlement agent in a real estate transac-
tion, the company may be liable in tort if it fails to perform its duties as a
settlement agent with reasonable care.' 7 In states that impose upon title
insurance companies a statutory duty to search public records prior to
until the company had a reasonable time to cure the defect, but allowing the insured to
proceed immediately with a tort action against the company).
14. See, e.g., id. (allowing the insured to file a claim in tort despite its inability to
maintain a contract claim); cf. Soutullo, 646 So. 2d at 1354 (holding that the title insurance
company's curative actions may have precluded a claim under the policy, but could not
preclude the insured's tort claims).
15. See, e.g., Martinka v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 836 S.W.2d 773, 778
(Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the title insurance company's failure to disclose a defect
did not violate the Texas deceptive trade practice statute); Greenberg, 492 N.W.2d at 149
(rejecting insured's tort claims based on misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of fidu-
ciary duty).
16. See, e.g., Heyd v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 354 N.W.2d 154, 158 (Neb. 1984).
17. See, e.g., Aronoff v. Lenkin Co., 618 A.2d 669, 687 (D.C. 1992) (finding that a title
company serving as a settlement agent in a real estate transaction had a non-policy fiduci-
ary duty to inform the seller of known title defects so that the seller could take steps to
resolve them prior to the settlement date); Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d
650, 654-55 (Utah 1990) (determining that a title company is not liable as an abstractor
when it issues a commitment or policy, but could be liable as a settlement agent for negli-
gent misrepresentation in failing to carry out the lender's closing instructions).
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issuing a title insurance policy, the statute may provide a tort remedy for
the insured. 18 However, apart from claims arising independently of a title
insurance policy or commitment, this Article concludes that a title insur-
ance policy limits an insured's remedies for a title defect to the remedies
provided by the policy.
In drawing this conclusion, this Article first will examine the transac-
tional context that gives rise to the opposing views regarding tort liability.
This Article will then review each line of cases, analyzing the opposing
viewpoints and illuminating the weaknesses of the tort liability theories.
Finally, this Article will discuss and critique the public policy arguments
that have been advanced in favor of a tort remedy, leading to the conclu-
sion that a title insurance company generally should be held liable only
within the limits of the policy.
I. THE TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT OF TITLE INSURANCE: INFORMATION
OR INDEMNITY?
In determining the extent of a title insurance company's liability, au-
thorities disagree on whether a title insurance company, in issuing title
commitments and policies, has undertaken a distinct duty to provide its
insured with title information.19 Courts that view title insurance compa-
nies as suppliers of information tend to hold that the companies are sub-
ject to the rules of tort liability applicable to title abstractors.2 ° Courts
that do not view title insurance companies as suppliers of information
usually find tort principles inapplicable on grounds that the title insur-
ance policy provides both the source and measure of the company's
liability.
21
18. Compare Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. of Idaho, 764 P.2d 423,
426-27 (Idaho 1988) (finding no tort liability under an Idaho statute requiring title com-
pany to search public records prior to issuing title insurance policy) and Walker Rogge,
Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 218-20 (N.J. 1989) (finding that no tort
liability arose under a New Jersey statute requiring title companies to make a reasonable
title examination prior to insuring title) with Bank of Cal., 826 P.2d at 1130 (imposing
liability in tort on a mortgage lender under an Alaska statute requiring title insurers to
conduct title searches) and Ruiz v. Garcia, 850 P.2d 972, 975 (N.M. 1993) (holding that a
title company could be liable in tort to seller under a New Mexico statute which required
title searches).
19. Compare Heyd, 354 N.W.2d at 158 (determining that a title insurance company
issuing a commitment and a policy is liable for two separate duties - the duty to search
and the duty to indemnify) with Walker Rogge, 562 A.2d at 220 (holding that the title
insurance company's only duty to the insured under commitment and policy is to indem-
nify for losses covered by the policy in accordance with the policy's terms and conditions).
20. See, e.g., Ford v. Guarantee Abstract and Title Co., Inc., 553 P.2d 254, 266 (Kan.
1976).
21. See, e.g., Walker Rogge, 562 A.2d at 218-19.
1995]
Catholic University Law Review
The disagreement between the divergent lines of cases arises because
purchasers of real estate often rely on the title insurance company to
serve not only as an insurer, but also as a supplier of information regara-
ing the titles they will acquire.22 Some courts and commentators have
suggested that applicants for title insurance are as interested in obtaining
the results of the title insurance company's search of public records as
they are in obtaining insurance coverage.23
Even courts that decline to hold a title insurance company liable in tort
concede that the insured expects the title insurance company to conduct a
reasonable search of public records.24 Contracts to purchase real estate
usually specify that the purchaser must receive good and marketable title
and provide that the purchase may cancel the contract if this condition is
unsatisfied.25 The purchaser usually relies on his attorney or a title insur-
ance company to assure that title is marketable; but in most cases the
purchaser has little or no understanding of the process involved in ob-
taining such assurance. Usually the attorney or a settlement company
will order a commitment for title insurance, often called a binder, from a
title insurance company, either directly or through a title insurance
agent.26
Commitments for title insurance contain statements that purchasers
and their attorneys use as title information.27 A section of the commit-
ment entitled "Requirements" typically lists mortgages that must be paid
and other conditions that must be met before the title insurance company
will insure the purchaser's title.28 A separate section in the commitment
entitled "Exceptions" lists various aspects of title (e.g., mortgages, ease-
22. See Bank of Cal., 826 P.2d at 1129.
23. See, e.g., id. at 1129-30 (stating that "[t]itle insurance is often ordered not for the
insurance itself but to obtain the use of the insurer's title plant and the expertness of its
employees in handling the search process") (quoting D. BURKE, LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE
§ 12.1, at 362 (1986)); see also Quintin Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 494
(1957). Professor Johnstone noted that:
Applicants for a title insurance policy are interested in obtaining the insurance
coverage, but they are sometimes more interested in what the company examina-
tion of title discloses. This is perhaps partly at the base of the prevailing philoso-
phy of title insurance companies - stressing the service of risk delineation rather
than risk coverage.
Id.
24. See, e.g., Walker Rogge, 562 A.2d at 220.
25. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 2, § 11.12 (explaining that a prospective pur-
chaser must search the land records to ensure that title is good).
26. See id. § 11.14, at 874.
27. See id. at 874-75.
28. See AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION, supra note 12, 1982 Commitment
Form, § 111-2, at 4 [hereinafter 1982 Commitment Form]. If the requirements are satisfied,
the commitment obligates the company to issue a policy of title insurance. Id.
[Vol. 45:71
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ments, or covenants) that the title insurance policy will not cover.29 A
purchaser usually assumes that if the commitment's requirements are sat-
isfied, he will receive good title to the property, subject to only the speci-
fied exceptions. If the purchaser finds the exceptions acceptable, he will
proceed to closing, pay the purchase price, and obtain a deed to the prop-
erty. After the deed is recorded, the title insurance company will issue a
policy based upon the commitment.
A purchaser's reliance on title insurance as a source of information
contrasts with commitment and policy provisions that limit a title insur-
ance company's liability to that of an insurer. Most title insurance com-
mitments and policies follow standard forms published by the American
Land Title Association (ALTA), with variations in some states.30 The ti-
tle insurance policy itself is a contract of indemnity.3' It requires the title
insurance company to defend the insured against any legal challenges to
his title32 and, if the title proves to be defective, to indemnify the insured
for any loss, up to the face amount of the policy.
33
29. See id. at 5. For example, in a typical title insurance commitment for the purchase
of a home, the requirements would include paying off the seller's mortgage and recording
the purchaser's deed. The exceptions would include any mortgage that the purchaser uses
to finance the transaction as well as various recorded easements and covenants affecting
the property.
30. BURKE, supra note 1, § 2.4, at 2:20.
31. Focus Inv. Assocs., Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 1231, 1237 (1st Cir.
1993); Southland Title Corp. v. Superior Court, 282 Cal. Rptr. 425, 429 (Cal. Ct. App.) ("A
title insurance policy is '. . . a contract to indemnify against loss caused by defects in the
title or encumbrances on the title' ") (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.,
223 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4321 (Cal.
1991); Martinka v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 836 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992) (stating that "ft]itle insurance is a contract of indemnity. The relationship between
the parties to the contract is basically limited to that of indemnitor and indemnitee.") (cita-
tions omitted).
32. The 1992 ALTA Owner's Policy provides, in Paragraph 4(a) of the policy's Condi-
tions and Stipulations, that:
Upon written request by the insured . . . the Company, at its own cost and
without unreasonable delay, shall provide for the defense of an insured in litiga-
tion in which any third party asserts a claim adverse to the title or interest as
insured, but only as to those stated causes of action alleging a defect, lien or en-
cumbrance or other matter insured against by this policy.
1992 Owner's Policy, supra note 12, § 11-2, at 6. Paragraph 4(a) of the ALTA Loan Policy
contains similar provisions. See 1992 Loan Policy, supra note 12, § II-1, at 7.
33. The first page, or jacket sheet, of the ALTA standard Owner's Policy provides that
the title insurance company:
insures... against loss or damage, not exceeding the Amount of Insurance stated
in Schedule A, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of:
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested other
than as stated therein;
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title;
3. Unmarketability of the title;
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Neither the commitment nor the policy purports to constitute a report
or an abstract of title.34 Although a title insurance company usually will
have searched public records prior to issuing a commitment for title in-
surance,35 and in some states is required by statute to conduct such a
search,36 a commitment for title insurance typically does not state that
any title search has been conducted.37 Instead, the commitment purports
to be nothing more than an undertaking to issue a policy of title insurance
if certain conditions are satisfied.38
The standard ALTA Commitment Form states that the commitment is
"preliminary to the issuance of [a policy] of title insurance."39 The ALTA
Commitment Form further provides that all of the company's liabilities
and obligations under the commitment terminate upon issuance of the
policy.4  Thus, a title insurance company's duties under the commitment,
even if they included a duty to search the public records, would not sur-
4. Lack of a right of access to and from the land.
1992 Owner's Policy, supra note 12, § 11-2, at 1. The jacket sheet of the ALTA Loan Policy
contains the same insuring clauses, as well as additional clauses insuring the validity and
priority of the insured mortgage. 1992 Loan Policy, supra note 12, § II-1, at 1.
34. See AMERICAN LAND TITLE AssoCIATION, supra note 12, 1966 Commitment
Form, § 111-1 [hereinafter 1966 Commitment Form]; 1992 Owner's Policy, supra note 12,
§ 11-2.
35. BURKE, supra note 1, § 15.2, at 15:8-:9.
36. See, e.g., Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 218 (N.J.
1989) (holding that the title insurance company was required by statute to conduct a title
search, regardless of whether the owner made such a request).
37. See generally BURKE, supra note 1, § 15.2, at 15:9 (stating that the commitment is
"neither an insurance agreement nor an abstract; as a matter of contract, it does not reflect
the state of the title, but only the terms under which an insurer will issue a policy").
In practice, title insurance companies do not always conduct a full search of the public
land records each time they issue a policy of title insurance. If a title insurance company
has access to a previous title search of the property - a "back title" - the company may
conduct only a "bring down" search for the time period after the date of the previous
search. Some title insurance companies maintain their own "plants," comprising private
copies or abstracts of the public records, which the companies use as their source of title
information in preparing commitments and policies.
38. Id.
39. 1966 Commitment Form, supra note 34, § 111-1, at 1. In accordance with the title
insurance company's view that its only undertaking under the commitment is the issuance
of a policy, the 1966 ALTA Commitment Form identifies the customer as the "proposed
Insured." Id. The 1982 ALTA Commitment Form, which endeavors to use plain language,
refers to the customer simply as "you." 1982 Commitment Form, supra note 28, § 111-2, at
1.
40. Specifically, the form provides that "all liability and obligations hereunder shall
cease and terminate (here state the time) after the effective date hereof or when the policy
or policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to
issue such policy or policies is not the fault of the Company." 1966 Commitment Form,
supra note 34, § III-1, at 1.
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vive the issuance of the title insurance policy contemplated by the
commitment.
Additional provisions of the ALTA Commitment Form define and limit
the title insurance company's liability in instances when it does not issue a
policy.41 The ALTA Commitment Form limits the company's liability to
out-of-pocket costs the proposed insured incurred while preparing to
close the transaction for which the commitment was issued, subject to an
overall limit equal to the amount of insurance under the proposed title
insurance policy.42 The ALTA Commitment Form also incorporates by
reference the "insuring provisions and Conditions and Stipulations and
the Exclusions from Coverage" that a policy issued pursuant to the com-
mitment would contain, thereby making the policy's contractual limita-
tions on the company's liability applicable to any claim arising under the
commitment.43 The ALTA Commitment Form limits any claim by the
proposed insured based on the status of title to the property to the terms
of the commitment.44
Consistent with the ALTA Commitment Form, ALTA's standard
owner's and loan policy forms provide for the integration of prior deal-
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. This paragraph provides:
Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named
proposed Insured and such parties included under the definition of Insured in the
form of policy or policies committed for and only for actual loss incurred in reli-
ance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements
hereof, or (b) to eliminate exceptions shown in Schedule B, or (c) to acquire or
create the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment.
In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the
policy or policies committed for and such liability is subject to the insuring provi-
sions and Conditions and Stipulations and the Exclusions from Coverage of the
form of policy or policies committed for in favor of the proposed Insured which
are hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part of this Commitment
except as expressly modified herein.
Id. Paragraph 4 of the Conditions of the 1982 ALTA Commitment Form similarly states
that "[w]e shall not be liable for more than the Policy Amount shown in Schedule A of this
Commitment and our liability is subject to the terms of the Policy form to be issued to
you." 1982 Commitment Form, supra note 28, § 111-2, at 6.
43. See 1966 Commitment Form, supra note 34, § III-1, at 4.
44. Paragraph 4 of the Conditions and Stipulations of the 1966 ALTA Commitment
Form provides:
Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may have or
may bring against the Company arising out of the status of the title to the estate
or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment
must be based on and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment.
Id. Paragraph 5 of the Conditions of the 1982 ALTA Commitment Form provides: "Any
claim, whether or not based on negligence, which you may have against us concerning the
title to the land must be based on this Commitment and is subject to its terms." 1982
Commitment Form, supra note 28, § 111-2, at 6.
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ings between the company and the insured. 5 In addition to incorporat-
ing all prior dealings between the insurer and the insured, the ALTA
policy forms restrict the liability of the insurer solely to the terms of the
policy.
46
II. JUDICIAL VIEWS OF THE TITLE INSURER'S OBLIGATION
A. The Contract View
Perhaps the leading authority establishing that a title insurance policy
is the exclusive source and measure of a title insurance company's liabil-
ity is the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Walker Rogge, Inc. v.
Chelsea Title & Guaranty Co.." In Walker Rogge, an investor purchased
a parcel of land which he thought comprised eighteen acres, but actually
comprised only twelve acres.48 His title insurance policy afforded him no
remedy for the shortage because he had received good title to the prop-
erty covered by his contract. 49 Lacking a contract remedy, the purchaser
sued his title insurance company in tort, alleging that the company negli-
gently failed to search its own records, which showed that the actual size
of the land was less than the purchaser expected. 50 The purchaser argued
that he had engaged the title insurance company not only to insure the
title but also to examine the title.51 The purchaser further contended that
the company, as a title examiner, had a duty to advise him of any infor-
mation in the public records which would materially affect his purchase of
the property, and that the title insurance company breached this duty by
failing to advise him of the deficiency in acreage.52
45. Paragraph 14(a) of the ALTA Loan Policy provides: "This policy together with all
endorsements, if any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and contract
between the insured and the Company." 1992 Loan Policy, supra note 12, § 11-1, at 12.
Paragraph 15(a) of the ALTA Owner's Policy is identical. 1992 Owner's Policy, supra note
12, § 11-2, at 10.
46. Paragraph 14(b) of the ALTA Loan Policy further provides:
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and which
arises out of the status of the lien of the insured mortgage or of the title to the
estate or interest covered hereby or by any action asserting such claim, shall be
restricted to this policy.
1992 Loan Policy, supra note 12, § 11-1, at 12. Paragraph 15 (b) of the 1992 ALTA Owner's
Policy is identical, except that it makes no reference to the "lien of the insured mortgage."
1992 Owner's Policy, supra note 12, § 11-2, at 10.
47. 562 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1989).
48. Id. at 212-13.
49. Id. at 215 (stating that "[tjitle companies are in the business of guaranteeing title,
not acreage").
50. Id. at 213.
51. Id. at 218.
52. Id. at 213.
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The title insurance company in Walker Rogge apparently used the stan-
dard ALTA forms, and thus had made no express contractual undertak-
ing to examine the title to the property.53 Nevertheless, the purchaser
argued that the duties of an abstractor should be implied from the com-
pany's examination of the title, the separate fee it charged for conducting
the examination, and its issuance of a commitment for title insurance.54
In the purchaser's view, the commitment should be construed as an ab-
stract of the public records, and the title insurance company should be
held liable in tort because the commitment failed to disclose material title
information which could have been discovered by a reasonable record
search.
55
The court in Walker Rogge rejected the purchaser's arguments, holding
that, absent some special undertaking outside the scope of the title insur-
ance commitment and policy, the company had no duty to search the title
to the property.56 The court explained that the primary issue was
whether a title insurance company, by issuing an ALTA Commitment
Form and a policy, had a duty "to search for and disclose to the insured
any reasonably discoverable information" that might be material to the
insured's decision to finalize the transaction.57 The court resolved the
issue by applying "the general rule in New Jersey" that the terms of the
policy provided the only source of the title insurance company's duties.
Under this rule a title insurance company as such could not be sued for
the negligent search of title records. 58
In the court's view, the title insurance company's issuance of a commit-
ment for title insurance to the purchaser and its $75.00 fee for searching
the title were insufficient to charge it with the liabilities of an abstractor.59
The court explained that, for the purchaser to have a cause of action in
negligence, some additional agreement would be required - presumably
an explicit undertaking by the title insurance company to search the pub-
lic records or its preparation for the insured of an abstract or report of
title.60
53. Id. at 216.
54. Id. at 217-18.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 218, 221.
57. Id. at 217.
58. Id. at 217-18.
59. Id. at 218.
60. Id. The court in Walker Rogge qualified its holding by stating that: "[i]f, however,
the title company agrees to conduct a search and provide the insured with an abstract of
title in addition to the title policy, it may expose itself to liability for negligence as a title
searcher in addition to its liability under the policy." Id.
19951
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:71
In reaching this result, the court sounded three themes that permeate
the cases declining to impose a duty to search on a title company: (1) that
neither the commitment nor the policy contains an undertaking by the
title insurance company to search the public records;61 (2) that the es-
sence of a customer's transaction with his title insurance company is to
obtain insurance protection rather than information;62 and (3) that a title
insurance company has a contractual right to limit its liability for
damages.
63
Addressing the purchaser's argument that he expected the title insur-
ance company to search the public records, the court in Walker Rogge
held that this expectation could not give rise to an express or implied duty
to conduct such a search because the relationship between the parties was
primarily contractual.64 Under the title insurance commitment, the in-
sured could reasonably expect only to be "insure[d] against certain risks
subject to the terms of the policy."'65 The court further held that the title
insurance company had the right to limit its liability to the terms of the
ALTA Commitment Form and policy.66 Noting that the title insurance
company would be exposed to consequential damages for negligent title
searches if it was not permitted to limit its liability,67 the court observed
that such an exposure would violate the familiar principle of contract law
61. See id.; see also Horn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 557 P.2d 206, 208 (N.M. 1976)
(superseded by statutory tort remedy as stated in Ruiz v. Garcia, 850 P.2d 972 (N.M.
1993)). In Horn, the court made the same point, stating:
The rights and duties of the parties are fixed by the contract of title insur-
ance .... Hence, any duty on the part of defendant to search the records must be
expressed in or implied from the policy of title insurance. We have carefully read
the policy and cannot find any language expressing an intent to impose such a
duty on defendant, nor any language from which such an intent can be im-
plied .... It is well settled that the courts will not make a contract of insurance,
but will only enforce the intent of the parties as manifested by the writing.
Id. After Horn was decided, the New Mexico legislature adopted a statute providing that
"[n]o title insurance policy may be written unless the title insurer or its title insurance
agent has caused to be conducted a reasonable search and examination of the title." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59A-30-11.A (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1995). This statute has been interpreted
as providing purchasers and sellers with a tort remedy if a title insurance company is negli-
gent in conducting the required search. Ruiz v. Garcia, 850 P.2d 972, 976-77 (N.M. 1993).
The court in Ruiz expressly declined to overrule Horn, which remains the court's interpre-
tation of a title insurance company's liability under a title insurance commitment and pol-
icy. Id. at 976 n.3.
62. Walker Rogge, 562 A.2d at 220.
63. Id.
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that a plaintiff may not recover consequential damages unless both par-
ties contemplated such damages when they entered into the contract.68
The court's reasoning in Walker Rogge comports with the economic
principle that systems of insurance protection depend on the insurance
companies' ability to quantify the risk they assume, charge premiums
commensurate with the risk, and establish reserves sufficient to cover ac-
tuarially predictable losses under their policies. Under this view, a title
insurance company's search of the public records is a function it performs
for its own benefit when underwriting a policy, not for the purpose of
supplying title information to the insured.69 Similarly, a title insurance
commitment is not a report or abstract of title, but rather constitutes an
undertaking by a title insurance company to issue a policy on the terms
and conditions the commitment sets forth.7 °
68. Id. (citing Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160 (N.J. 1982)).
69. Id. at 218. This view is stated emphatically in Martinka v. Commonwealth Land
Title Insurance Co., 836 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that title insurance
company only had a duty to defend insured against actions arising from title defects, not to
examine the title). Specifically, the court stated:
"[The title insurance] company, before issuing a policy of title insurance, must
necessarily take steps to inform itself of the status of the title to be insured. In the
search for the information upon which must depend the decision to either issue or
decline to commit itself to issue a policy, the insurance company obviously inves-
tigates the title for its own use and benefit to determine whether it will undertake
the risk. The title information on which the company bases its decision relates to
the condition of the title held by the grantor and is not made for the prospective
grantee or lienholder to whom the policy will finally issue."
Id. at 777-78 (quoting Tamburine v. Center Sav. Ass'n, 583 S.W.2d 942, 948-49 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1979); accord Greenberg v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 492 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Wis. 1992)
(stating that "[a]ny search done by an insurer in preparation for preparing a title commit-
ment is done to protect itself in deciding whether to insure the property and to protect
against losses covered in the policy").
Until recently many lawyers believed that New York was one of the jurisdictions holding
that a title insurance company could be held liable in tort based on an implied duty to
search the public records. See L. Smirlock Realty Corp. v. Title Guar. Co., 418 N.E.2d 650,
655 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that "it is because title insurance companies combine their search
and disclosure expertise with insurance protection that an implied duty arises out of the
title insurance agreement that the insurer has conducted a reasonably diligent search.").
However, in Citibank, N.A. v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., 632 N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1995), the court held that "Smirlock did not ... create a right of action in behalf of the
insured against the title insurer for negligence in conducting a title search." Id. at 782. The
title insurance company in Smirlock had denied coverage on the ground that the insured
had failed to inform the company of a title defect known to the insured, but the court of
appeals held that the company could not assert this defense because the title defect was a
matter of public record. Smirlock, 418 N.E.2d at 652, 654. The court in Citibank viewed
Smirlock's comment regarding the title insurance company's duty to search as addressing
the company's responsibility for searching the public records to protect its own interests as
an insurer. Citibank, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
70. See Greenberg, 492 N.W.2d at 151, where the court explained that:
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The economic principles of the insurance business played a prominent
role in the development of title insurance company liability law in Cali-
fornia. In the 1975 decision of Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance
Co.," a division of the California Court of Appeals ruled that a title in-
surance company could be held liable in tort for errors contained in a
"preliminary title report," which is California's equivalent of a commit-
ment for title insurance. 72 The court in Jarchow stated that the title insur-
ance company's liability in a tort action could include punitive damages,
damages for emotional distress, and other damages that fell outside the
scope of the title insurance policy. The court further held that the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery in a tort action need not be limited by
the amount of insurance purchased under the policy.
73
Perceiving the holding in Jarchow as a threat to the safety and sound-
ness of California's title insurance industry, the California Insurance
Commission supported legislation, which was adopted in 1981 as part of
the California Insurance Code, providing that title insurance policies and
preliminary reports of title are not to be construed as representations of
title.74
The California Court of Appeals interpreted the new statute in South-
land Title Corp. v. Superior Court.75 In Southland Title Corp., the plain-
tiffs sued the title insurance company for negligent title examination,
[T]he issuance of a title commitment does not ... constitute an independent un-
dertaking by the insurer to search the title for the benefit of the insured. Rather,
the title commitment "generally constitutes no more than a statement of the
terms and conditions upon which the insurer is willing to issue its title policy."
Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 237 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987)).
71. 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (overruled by statute as stated in South-
land Title Corp. v. Superior Court, 282 Cal. Rptr. 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)).
72. Id. at 485.
73. See id. at 486 (asserting that the insured could recover all damages the title insurer
proximately caused in breaching its duty to search).
74. CAL. INS. CODE § 12340.11 (West 1988). The statute defines "preliminary report,"
"commitment," or "binder" as:
reports furnished in connection with an application for title insurance and are
offers to issue a title policy subject to the stated exceptions set forth in the reports
and such other matters as may be incorporated by reference therein. The reports
are not abstracts of title, nor are any of the rights, duties or responsibilities appli-
cable to the preparation and issuance of an abstract of title applicable to the issu-
ance of any report. Any such report shall not be construed as, nor constitute, a
representation as to the condition of title to real property, but shall constitute a
statement of the terms and conditions upon which the issuer is willing to issue its
title policy, if such offer is accepted.
Id.
75. 282 Cal. Rptr. 425 (Cal. Ct. App.), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4321 (Cal.
1991).
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arguing that the court should infer a duty to search because "in the every-
day world of real estate transactions buyers and sellers continue to order
and rely upon preliminary title reports as an integral part of the sale
transaction., 7 6 Addressing the insured's expectations, the court held that
"[t]he prospective insured reasonably concludes a transaction in reliance
not on the preliminary report, but on the anticipated policy of title insur-
ance." 77 A prospective purchaser therefore may not reasonably rely on a
preliminary report as providing title information because, by its terms
and by statute, a preliminary report does not constitute a representation
as to the condition of title to real property.78 The court explained that
"[t]he statutory changes establish that a 'preliminary report' is an integral
part of the issuance of title insurance and nothing more.",
79
Focusing on the insurance company's reasonable expectations, the
court rejected the purchaser's contention that the title insurance company
had issued its preliminary report of title, which was done without charge,
for the purpose of inducing the purchaser to enter into the underlying
76. Id. at 429.
77. Id. at 430.
78. Id. at 429.
Another recent case holding that a title insurance policy is not a representation of the
state of a property's title is Focus Inv. Assocs., Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 992 F.2d
1231 (1st Cir. 1993). In this case, the title company's agent, in issuing a loan policy of title
insurance, had not conducted any search of the title, but simply had relied on the bor-
rower's own statement as to the status of liens against the property. Id. at 1233. The court
rejected the lender's negligence claims based on its view that the issuance of a title insur-
ance policy implied no duty on the part of the insurer to search the title. Id. at 1236. The
court also rejected the lender's negligent misrepresentation claims based on its view that a
policy of title insurance is a "contract of indemnity," and that the policies issued as an
insurer "were not representations of title" and "cannot, as a matter of law, form the basis
of a claim of negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 1237. The court, however, distinguished
Focus Investment from cases in which a title insurance company had issued a preliminary
report of title, implying that the issuance of a preliminary report could constitute an under-
taking by the company of the duties of an abstractor. Id. at 1236.
79. Southland Title Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. at 429. To clarify this point further for pur-
chasers, California revised its Insurance Code in 1994 to require title insurance companies
to disclose that a preliminary report is not an abstract of title. Section 12414.30 of the
Insurance Code provides:
(a) When constituting an offer to issue an owner's policy of title insurance, a
preliminary report shall incorporate the following statement, in bold print on
front of the preliminary report:
"Please read the exceptions shown or referred to below and the exceptions
and exclusions set forth in Exhibit A of this report carefully. The exceptions
and exclusions are meant to provide you with notice of matters which are not
covered under the terms of the title insurance policy and should be carefully
considered. It is important to note that this preliminary report is not a writ-
ten representation as to the condition of title and may not list all liens, de-
fects, and encumbrances affecting title to the land."
CAL. INS. CODE § 12414.30 (West Supp. 1996).
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real estate transaction.8" Title insurance companies, the court observed,
make their profits from premiums, which are calculated based on the
risks the company assumes when it issues title insurance policies.8 ' The
court concluded that the issuer of a preliminary report merely intends to
induce the prospective insured to purchase a policy of title insurance and
to declare in advance of such purchase the precise risk that the company
is to assume.82
California's experience shows that tort liability, as imposed by Jarchow,
disrupted the established system of title insurance protection. Because
Jarchow allowed insureds to recover damages beyond the scope of the
policy and exceeding the amount of insurance, title insurance companies
no longer had a predictable basis for determining the risks on which to
calculate their premium charges.83 The 1981 amendments to the Insur-
ance Code were intended to prevent the unfunded liability' which re-
sulted from the uncertainty Jarchow introduced.85
80. Southland Title Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
81.' Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. (maintaining that insurance companies derive their profit from premiums,
which are directly related to the risk they are assuming).
84. Title insurance companies are regulated under state law, and most states have
adopted statutes establishing financial requirements for companies engaged in the business
of title insurance. These requirements, which may include minimum amounts of paid-in
capital, surplus or reserves, are designed to assure that a title insurance company will have
the financial resources to pay claims that may be asserted under the company's policies.
See generally BURKE, supra note 1, § 6.3, at 6:13. Tort remedies give rise to unanticipated
liabilities for which a title insurance company may have collected insufficient premiums,
thereby disrupting state regulatory schemes designed to assure that the company will have
sufficient funds to pay claims.
85. California Department of Insurance, Enrolled Bill Report on Bill No. AB 334
(June 2, 1981), provided:
Existing law does not expressly define the terms "abstract of title," "prelimi-
nary report," "commitment," or "binder," but they have come to have trade defi-
nitions through usage over the years. However, several court cases have held
preliminary title reports to be abstracts of title, and, thus, the title insurer is held
to the standard of an abstractor of title.
This bill would define the appropriate terms to ensure that the distinction be-
tween "abstract of title" and "preliminary report" is restored to the usage and
practice in effect before the cases were decided ....
[Tihe bill ... will help assure that the title insurers are able to charge appropri-
ate premiums for foreseeable liability, rather than as is the case under current
case law. Since the premiums or fees charged for preliminary reports are much
less than those for abstracts, the result of such decisions is to impose liability on
the insurers to an extent beyond which they have computed the premium charge
(i.e., an unfunded liability).
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Because the 1981 revisions to the California Insurance Code did no
more than declare the plain meaning of a preliminary report,86 the ques-
tion naturally arises as to why the court in Jarchow chose to engraft prin-
ciples of tort liability onto California's system of insurance protection.
The same question may be asked regarding court decisions in other states
that adopted Jarchow's rule.87
B. The Tort View
Decided in 1975, Jarchow was the seminal modern case holding that a
title insurance company may be liable to its insured in tort based on an
implied duty to search the public records.88 In the Jarchow court's view,
a title insurance company that provides an insured with a "preliminary
report" prior to a real estate closing assumes two separate responsibilities
to the insured: (1) the duty of an abstractor to examine the public records
and to report all matters affecting title;89 and (2) the duty of an insurer
under the title insurance policy.90 The court held that the title insurance
company's liability as an abstractor sounds "in tort," 91 and that the in-
sured could recover all damages the title insurance company's negligence
proximately caused, including damages for emotional distress. 92 The
86. CAL. INS. CODE § 12340.11 (West 1988).
87. See supra note 5 (listing cases holding that a title insurance company may be sub-
ject to tort liability).
88. Prior cases are sometimes cited to support this position. See Henkels v. Philadel-
phia Title Ins. Co., 110 A.2d 878, 879-80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (holding that defendant title
insurance company had liability as an abstractor independent of the title insurance policy
when it agreed to examine and search the title and had issued a separate "Settlement Cer-
tificate" prior to closing the sale which failed to disclose tax liens that the title company's
search of the public records revealed); Dorr v. Massachusetts Title Ins. Co., 131' N.E. 191,
192 (Mass. 1921) (finding that the defendant title insurance company was liable after it had
agreed at the customer's request to examine the title and only issued the policy at a later
date at its own suggestion and without charge to the customer). Henkels and Dorr are of
limited usefulness because the title companies' tort liability in those cases was based on
express undertakings to examine title. The authority of those cases also is attenuated be-
cause they were decided prior to the current ALTA policy forms.
89. Jarchow, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
90. Id. at 487.
91. Id. at 486.
92. Id. at 476. The facts of Jarchow are as follows: the defendant title insurance com-
pany issued a preliminary report showing that a parcel the purchasers intended to acquire
had no significant clouds on title. Id. at 477. Although the title company discovered an
easement affecting the title, the company's preliminary report failed to list that easement
as an exception to coverage. Id. Shortly after the closing, the buyers discovered a second
easement after the easement holder made a claim against the purchasers. After the title
company refused to take legal action to cure the defect, the buyers instituted their own
action against the neighbors to remove the second easement as a cloud on title and against
the title company for compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 477-78. The jury de-
clined to award punitive damages, but granted each of the four buyers damages for emo-
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opinion suggested that the jury would have been entitled to award puni-
tive damages if it had determined that the title insurance company had
acted "maliciously" or "outrageously" toward the plaintiffs, or had "de-
fraud[ed]" them. 3
The Jarchow opinion gave no explanation for holding the title insur-
ance company liable as an abstractor, relying primarily on a California
Supreme Court decision which stated, in an unrelated context, that pre-
liminary title reports are equivalent to abstracts of title.94 The title insur-
ance company's bad faith refusal to defend the insureds' title to their
property, which is tortious under California law, apparently influenced
the Jarchow court's decision.95
Jarchow is no longer the law of California in light of the 1981 statute
cited in Southland Title Corp. v. Superior Court.96 Nonetheless, Jarchow
was highly influential in persuading courts in other states to rule that a
title insurance company has an implied duty to search public records.97
Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., Inc.98 adopted the two-duty
rule announced in Jarchow - that the title insurance company is liable in
tional distress, expressly finding in answers to special interrogatories that the buyers'
emotional distress was caused by the title insurance company's negligence in failing to
disclose the first easement in the preliminary report of title and from its bad faith failure to
take action to remove the second easement. Id. at 480.
93. Id. at 476.
94. Id. at 485 (citing Hardy v. Admiral Oil Co., 366 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1961) (en banc)).
Hardy held only that a purchaser could recover its down payment on a contract to acquire
mineral leases where a preliminary title report showed that the seller did not own the
mineral rights to be leased. Hardy, 366 P.2d at 313. In reaching this result the court com-
mented that "[pireliminary title reports are, in effect, abstracts of title." Id. The Hardy
court did not address a title company's responsibility to its insured.
95. See Jarchow, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 486. In one part of its opinion, the court combined
the company's duty to search with its duty to defend:
[W]e hold that when a title company insures a buyer of real property against liens
and encumbrances of record and negligently fails to discover or disclose a re-
corded lien or encumbrance or fails to exclude a known recorded lien or encum-
brance from coverage and, upon being notified of the existence of a recorded lien
or encumbrance, unjustifiably refuses to take any legal action to clear the title or
eliminate the cloud, the insurer may be liable to the insured in compensatory
damages for any emotional distress which results.
Id. at 476.
96. 282 Cal. Rptr. 425 (Cal. Ct. App.), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4321 (Cal.
1991); see also supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative response to
the Jarchow decision). But see Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 237 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (applying the rule of Jarchow because the plaintiff's claim arose prior
to the 1981 amendments to the California Insurance Code, which the court declined to
apply retrospectively).
97. See supra note 5 (listing cases holding that a title insurance company may be sub-
ject to tort liability).
98. 553 P.2d 254 (Kan. 1976).
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contract under its policy and in tort as a supplier of information.99 The
occasion for Ford was a jury award of punitive damages in favor of pur-
chasers of a new home whose title proved to be defective.1"' The court
relied on Jarchow as the basis for its decision and on New Jersey cases
that have since been overruled.10 1 However, the court in Ford contrib-
uted its own rationale for the two-duty theory, drawing an analogy be-
tween the function performed by a title insurance company and that
performed by an attorney.102 The court reasoned that "a corporation or-
ganized for the purpose, among others, of examining and guaranteeing
titles to real estate... [which] assumes to discharge the same duties as an
individual conveyancer or attorney, has the same responsibilities and its
duty to its employer is governed by the principles applicable to attorney
and client., 10 3 The court reviewed the functions attorneys engaged in
real estate transactions historically performed and found them to be
comparable to the functions a title insurance company's examiner per-
forms."° In the court's view, comparable functions gave rise to compara-
ble responsibilities.1
0 5
Most of the courts that impose a duty to search the public records have
not relied on Ford's analogy between title insurance and the practice of
99. Id. at 268.
100. Id. at 258.
101. Id. at 264-66. The New Jersey rule that the court in Ford found "persuasive" is
contrary to the New Jersey Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in the leading case of
Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1989).
102. Ford, 553 P.2d at 264.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 263-64. The court in Ford noted that:
In the 1950's the use of abstracts to prove the seller's title began to decline,
particularly in the metropolitan areas of the state, and the combination of title
report and a title insurance policy was increasingly substituted for that purpose.
By the late 1960's the transition was almost universal and the abstract method was
rarely used in metropolitan areas.
Id. at 263.
105. Id. at 264; see also Shada v. Title & Trust Co. of Fla., 457 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (following a line of reasoning similar to Ford's regarding a title insurance com-
pany's tort liability), review denied, 464 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1985). The Shada court held:
We see no reason why the principles applicable to an abstracter [sic] should not
be applied to a title insurance company where it undertakes the duty to schedule
record title defects. The use of a title insurance binder or commitment instead of
an abstract and an attorney's opinion of title has become commonplace. A title
insurance company has a duty to exercise reasonable care when it issues a title
binder or commitment and its failure to do so may subject it to liability in either
contract or tort.
Id. at 557.
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law, nor have they relied on the provisions of the title insurance policy.' °6
Instead, they hold that the title insurance company's duty to search can
be implied from the title insurance commitment that precedes the policy,
especially when the purchaser relies on that commitment. 107 The court's
decision in Malinak v. Safeco Title Insurance Co. of Idaho1°8 exemplifies
this rationale. In Malinak, the court explained that "[a] title commitment
is in a somewhat different category from the title policy that follows it"
because the "commitment is ordered by the seller for the purpose of ex-
hibiting it to the buyer as a representation of the quality of the title seller
expects to sell to the buyer."' 019 In the court's view, "[t]he person who
seeks a title insurance commitment expects to obtain a professional title
search, as well as a professional legal opinion as to the condition of the
title and a guaranty that the title expressed in the commitment will be
insured to the extent of the policy coverage."' 0
The Supreme Court of Alaska espoused essentially the same view of
title insurance commitments in Bank of California, N.A. v. First American
Title Insurance Co.."' In Bank of California, the court applied the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts' standard for professional suppliers of infor-
mation to determine the insurance company's duty regarding a
commitment for title insurance." 2 The foundation of this duty, in the
court's opinion, was that commitments for title insurance "provide an es-
sential service to prospective buyers and lenders. They are told what
transactions must take place before they can receive clear title or an ef-
fective security.""' 3 The court also emphasized that title insurance com-
panies held themselves out as experts, leading parties to rely on
information in the preliminary title report as a guarantee of good title."'
106. See Focus Inv. Assocs., Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 1231, 1236 (1st Cir.
1993) (declining to impose a duty to search where the title insurance company had issued a
policy without first issuing a commitment).
107. Malinak v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 661 P.2d 12, 16 (Mont. 1983).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 15.
110. Id.
111. 826 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1992).
112. Id. at 1129 n.5. Section 522 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides in rele-
vant part:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if
he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977).
113. Bank of Cal., 826 P.2d at 1129.
114. Id. at 1129-30.
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To hold title insurance companies liable in tort, some courts have relied
on state statutes that require the title insurance company to perform a
search of the public records prior to issuing a title insurance commitment
or policy." 5 For example, the court in Bank of California offered an
Alaska statute as an alternative ground for holding a title insurance com-
pany liable in tort for a negligent title examination.' 6 The Supreme
Court of New Mexico has held that a similar statute in its state gave rise
to a private tort action for the insurance company's failure to conduct a
reasonable search of the public records.1 7 The Supreme Court of Idaho
held, however, that a title insurance company's breach of a duty to search
under an Idaho statute did not give rise to a private tort action in favor of
the insured." 8 Similarly, the court in Walker Rogge held that a title in-
surance company's duty to search under a New Jersey statute did not
create tort liability even if the company was negligent in conducting the
search." 9 As noted above, the court in Walker Rogge held that a title
insurance company's duty to its customer depends solely on the agree-
ment between the parties. 2°
Once a court finds that a title insurance company has a duty to search
the public records, the company is then potentially liable in tort for a
breach of that duty. Courts that impose this duty must next determine
whether the title insurance company has limited its tort liability by con-
tract, and, if so, whether such contractual limitations are effective. As
mentioned above, the ALTA Commitment Form provides that liability
under the commitment ceases upon the issuance of a policy of title insur-
ance, and the ALTA policy contains an integration clause merging all of
the insured's claims arising out of the status of the insured title into the
terms and conditions of the policy. 2'
In Bank of California the court construed the disclaimer of liability
contained in the commitment for title insurance as ineffective because the
language of the disclaimer was not sufficiently explicit.' 22 In a tortured
construction of the policy's integration clause, the court determined that
the clause applied only to contract claims under the policy and not to tort
115. See supra note 18 and cases cited therein.
116. Bank of Cal., 826 P.2d at 1130 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 21.66.170 (1992)).
117. Ruiz v. Garcia, 850 P.2d 972, 975 (N.M. 1993) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-
3071(A) (Michie 1978)); see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
118. Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. of Idaho, 764 P.2d 423,427 (Idaho
1988) (citing IDAHO CODE § 41-2708 (1977)).
119. Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d. 208, 218 (N.J. 1989)
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:46B-1 to -62 (West 1988)).
120. Id.; see supra note 58.
121. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
122. Bank of Cal., N.A. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Alaska 1992).
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claims under the title insurance commitment. 123 As an alternative basis
for holding that the commitment and policy were ineffective to disclaim
liability for negligence, the court reasoned that "[a] title company is en-
gaged in a business affected with the public interest and cannot, by an
adhesory contract, exculpate itself from liability for negligence. ,124
The merits of Bank of California's alternative rationale for invalidating
the title insurance company's disclaimer of liability for negligence are
worthy of serious consideration. When a duty to search exists, particu-
larly under a statute designed to protect the insured, a court may be justi-
fied in concluding that a disclaimer of the statutory duty is contrary to
public policy and, therefore, unenforceable. 2 5 In the absence of a statute
mandating a title search and providing the insured with a private right of
action, however, it is difficult for this author to agree that a title insurance
company's disclaimer of liability for negligence is an unconscionable pro-
vision.1 26 Two reasons mandate this conclusion. First, the insured's no-
fault contractual remedy against the title insurance company for undis-
closed title defects is fair and reasonable. Second, the company has not
bargained for, nor received compensation for, the unlimited liability it
potentially may incur if the courts refuse to permit the company to limit
its liability to the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. This Arti-
cle develops these arguments more fully in the next section.
III. EVALUATING THE OPPOSING VIEWS
Walker Rogge and the other decisions that have declined to impose a
tort remedy for undisclosed title defects offer a simple and clear rationale
for their decision: the relationship between the company and the insured
arises out of the policy, which establishes and limits the rights of the in-
123. See id. at 1131 (stating that the bank's claim was "based on the preliminary com-
mitment rather than the title policy").
124. Id. at 1130 (quoting White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 315-16 (Cal.
1985) (en bane)); see also Municipality of Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261, 1265-66
(Alaska 1986) (noting that exculpatory clauses are "unconscionable" where "circumstances
indicate a vast disparity of bargaining power coupled with terms unreasonably favorable to
the stronger party").
125. Cf White, 710 P.2d at 315-16 (recognizing that contractual disclaimers may be void
if they are contrary to public policy).
126. Title abstractors, who are unquestionably in the business of supplying title infor-
mation, have been permitted in some states to limit their liability by contract. See, e.g.,
Corcoran v. Abstract & Title Co. of Md., 143 A.2d 808, 810 (Md. 1958) (stating that
"[s]ince the [abstractor's] liability is contractual, it may be limited in its scope by apt and
clear language brought home to the employer"). Under the view that Corcoran espoused,
even if a title insurance commitment did comprise title information, the company would




sured. 127 Therefore, the insured has no remedy outside the scope of the
policy. This view is logical, and its reasoning is sound. The opposing view
however, lacks a persuasive rationale.
The courts that afford a tort remedy against a title insurance company
for undisclosed title defects have offered three different rationales for
their opinion: (1) an implied contractual duty based on the presumed ex-
pectations of title insurance customers; 128 (2) a tort duty based on the
insurer's relationship to the insured, with some courts drawing an analogy
between that relationship and the attorney/client relationship;129 and (3)
a tort duty based on statute.
130
A. Critique of the Implied Contract Theory
As noted above, the courts that find an implied common law duty on
the part of title insurance companies to search the public records gener-
ally do not rely on the title insurance policy as the source of this duty, but
instead predicate it on the title insurance company's issuance of a com-
mitment for title insurance and the insured's reliance on that commit-
ment.13 ' The insured's right to rely on the commitment as a source of
title information, however, finds no textual support in the standard
ALTA Commitment Form. On the contrary, the ALTA Commitment
Form obligates the company only to issue a policy if and when the com-
mitment's conditions are satisfied, and explicitly provides that all of the
company's obligations under the commitment cease when it issues the
policy.132 Thus, the implied contract theory is problematic because the
127. Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 220 (N.J. 1989).
128. See Bank of Cal., 826 P.2d at 1129; Malinak v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 661
P.2d 12, 15 (Mont. 1983).
129. See Shada v. Title & Trust, Co. of Fla., 457 So. 2d 553, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984), review denied, 464 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1985); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co.,
Inc., 553 P.2d 254, 267 (Kan. 1976).
130. See Bank of Cal, 826 P.2d at 1130; Ruiz v. Garcia, 850 P.2d 972, 975 (N.M. 1993);
see supra note 18 and accompanying text. The author would not endorse such a statutory
scheme, nor would he favor implying a duty in tort from a statute that merely required a
title insurance company to conduct a reasonable search as a condition of issuing a policy.
The reason, as argued in this Article, is that tort liability is antithetical to a safe and sound
title insurance industry because of the uncertainty the tort remedy would create in a com-
pany's risk exposure. A statute that requires a title insurance company to search the public
records could be viewed as a measure to protect the safety and soundness of the title
insurance industry rather than as a law to provide an extra-contractual remedy to the
insured.
This Article will focus primarily on the common law theories governing a title insurance
company's liability to its customers and will not attempt to interpret particular state
statutes.
131. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
132. See 1982 Commitment Form, supra note 28, § 111-2, at 2.
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courts are implying an agreement that the company never intended to
make. To find an implied contractual duty to search, a court must disre-
gard the well-established principle that an insurer has the right to limit its
liability and to impose conditions and restrictions on its contractual un-
dertaking as long as those restrictions are not inconsistent with public
policy. 133 This principle finds expression in the familiar admonition that,
although insurance contracts are to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured, "courts should not write for the insured a better policy of insur-
ance than the one purchased."' 34
To ignore the plain meaning of the ALTA Commitment Form, a court
ordinarily would need to rely on its equitable powers to decline to en-
force unconscionable contractual provisions. Additionally, the court
would need to determine that a commitment for title insurance consti-
tutes an unconscionable bargain if the company fails to assume the liabil-
ity of an abstractor.
Bank of California and other decisions have justified disregarding the
provisions of the commitment by calling it a contract of adhesion.' 35 The
company's use of a standard commitment form, however, does not pro-
vide sufficient cause for courts to disregard the contractual language;
rather, such cause exists only if the commitment's provisions are unrea-
sonably favorable to the company. 136 Although none of the court deci-
sions favoring the tort view have ever declared a title insurance
commitment "unconscionable", these courts apparently have concluded,
at least implicitly, that the insured will suffer an injustice if his rights
under a title insurance commitment are limited to the issuance of a title
insurance policy.
The supposed injustice is that the insured's potential recovery against
the title insurance company is more limited in some respects than if the
insured were pursuing a negligence claim against an abstractor - nota-
bly, the limitation of the company's liability to the amount of insurance
133. W.E. Erickson Constr., Inc. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (enforcing the ALTA Commitment Form's exclusive remedy clause, the court relied
on the principle that "[an exclusive remedy clause will be enforced unless it violates public
policy, or something in the social relationship of the parties works against upholding the
clause") (quoting Harris v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 917 (Ill. 1988)). See generally 43 AM. JUR.
2D Insurance § 160 (1982).
134. Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 214 (N.J. 1989).
135. Bank of Cal., N.A. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Alaska 1992);
see also White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 315-16 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (noting
that because a title insurance company is affected with the public interest, the company
cannot escape liability for negligence through an adhesive contract).
136. Municipality of Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261, 1265-66 (Alaska 1986).
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purchased.137 Limiting the insured's recovery to the policy amount would
hardly be considered an unconscionable bargain, however, in any other
kind of insurance contract. For example, the insured under a life insur-
ance policy (or the insured's beneficiary) could not recover more than the
policy amount simply because the company failed to discover a fatal dis-
ease when it gave the insured a medical examination prior to issuing the
policy. By analogy, a title insurance company should not be held liable
for more than the policy amount simply because it failed to discover a
title defect prior to issuing the policy.
Even if a court believed that the policy amount represented an unfair
limitation on the insured's recovery, and that the fairness of a contract
was a proper subject of judicial inquiry, the court should not limit its con-
siderations of fairness to that single aspect of the policy. Instead the
court should consider the totality of the contractual relationship between
the company and the insured. Overall, a title insurance policy is a reason-
able bargain for the insured because it affords him with rights and reme-
dies far superior in many aspects to the remedies he would have against
an abstractor or attorney. The three basic advantages the title insurance
system has over a title reporting system are that: (1) the insured may
recover for losses or damages sustained because of a title defect without
having to prove fault on the part of the company;138 (2) subject to limited
exceptions, the insured may recover even for title defects that are undis-
closed in the public records; 139 and (3) the company will provide services
for the administration of title claims against the insured title, and has the
financial resources - liquidity and loss reserves - to pay valid claims.' 4 °
These advantages are examined below.
The first advantage, a no-fault contractual remedy, has both procedural
and substantive benefits. The court in Walker Rogge focused on the pro-
cedural benefit, noting that:
[I]n an action under the title policy, the insured may establish a
cause of action for breach of contract without establishing that
the title company breached the standard of care appropriate for
a reasonable title search. In an action in tort for the failure to
conduct such a search, the insured would be required to estab-
lish the appropriate standard of care applicable to title
searching.
141
137. See Walker Rogge, 562 A.2d at 220.
138. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
141. Walker Rogge, 562 A.2d at 220-21.
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Thus, in a contract claim against a title insurance company, unlike a negli-
gence claim against an abstractor, the insured is not required to retain an
expert witness to prove the standard of care in searching titles, and is
relieved of the risk that he will not be able to sustain his burden of prov-
ing this element of a negligence claim.
142
The substantive benefits of the no-fault remedy may be even greater
than the procedural benefits. A title insurance company agrees to indem-
nify its insured for loss or damage he incurs if the title is not as stated in
the policy, irrespective of whether the company could have ascertained
the title defects from a reasonable search of the public records. Often,
even a reasonable search would not reveal title defects, and, thus, negli-
gence in the search would be impossible to establish.143 Examples of title
defects that a reasonable search of public records often cannot discover
include: (1) defects hidden when deeds or other instruments have been
misindexed by the clerk; (2) defects resulting from forgeries of recorded
documents; (3) defects that have been concealed by incorrect recitals in
recorded documents; (4) defects resulting from the incompetency or
other disability of a seller in the chain of title; (5) defects resulting from
unrecorded marital interests (in states with dower or other marital
rights); (6) defects resulting from unfiled mechanics or materialmen's
liens which have priority over an insured deed or mortgage (if the title
insurance company has not taken exception for such liens); and (7) de-
fects resulting from the effect of creditors' rights laws on a prior deed in
the chain of title (but not the deed or mortgage to the insured).144 A
purchaser who relied on an abstract of title would have no remedy
against the abstractor for these kinds of title defects because the ab-
stractor could not have discovered these defects through a reasonable
search of the public records.
142. Cf. id. at 221 (upholding the dismissal of the negligence claims against the survey-
ors based upon lack of expert testimony regarding the appropriate standard of care).
143. See generally 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 243(2) (1966) (explaining that to establish
negligence, expert testimony is often necessary to determine the standard of care the court
should apply to the case).
144. For a general discussion of "off record" risks (i.e., risks that cannot be prevented
by a search of the public records), see BURKE, supra note 1, § 2.1.2, at 2:9. The 1992 ALTA
owners and lenders policies of title insurance now exclude coverage for creditors' rights
problems in connection with the deed to the insured. See, e.g., 1992 Loan Policy, supra
note 12, § I-1, at 3. However, they make no exclusion from coverage if a deed to one of
the seller's predecessors in title is voided under creditors' rights laws. These laws include
state laws that permit a property owner's creditors to avoid fraudulent or voluntary con-
veyances and the federal bankruptcy code's provisions allowing a bankruptcy trustee or
debtor-in-possession to avoid preferences or fraudulent transfers. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547
(preferences) and 11 U.S.C. § 548 (fraudulent transfers).
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In addition to the procedural and substantive benefits of the no-fault
remedy under the policy, title insurance companies provide their insureds
with important financial and administrative services which are unavaila-
ble from abstractors or attorneys. If the insured's title is challenged, the
policy obligates the title insurance company to provide the insured with
legal defense, and the company generally will do so by retaining counsel
experienced in handling real estate title litigation.'45 Abstractors cannot
provide this service; attorneys most likely will not. Because many claims
involve suits that are non-meritorious, the insured's right to have the title
insurance company provide the defense is one of the most important ben-
efits title insurance affords.
Equally important, the title insurance company maintains the financial
resources and liquidity to pay the insured's claim if a loss does occur.
146
Collection of a substantial claim from an abstractor or attorney may
prove problematic absent sufficient professional liability insurance. By
contrast, collection of a valid claim from a reputable title insurance com-
pany rarely involves significant credit risk.
These benefits of title insurance diminish the force of the argument
that a policy's limitations on the company's liability are overreaching or
unconscionable. Indeed, historically it was the customers' own desires to
enjoy these benefits that propelled the emergence of title insurance over
title reports or attorney opinions of title as the preferred method by
which purchasers and mortgage lenders protect themselves against the
risk of title defects. 14 7 This market phenomenon provides strong evi-
dence that the transaction set forth in the standard title insurance com-
mitment and policy form is an essentially fair bargain, without the
overreaching necessary to establish unconscionability. Therefore, the
bargain between the title insurance company and its insured provides no
basis for the courts to create remedies beyond those provided by the
policy.
B. Critique of the Tort Theory
A leading commentator who advocates a tort remedy recognizes that
no duty to search is established under the commitment or policy, but ar-
gues instead that the duty should be "premised on the relationship be-
145. See generally BURKE, supra note 1, § 12 (discussing provisions for, and conditions
to, the title insurance company's duty to defend the insured).
146. Id. § 6.3, at 6:13-:21 (discussing various statutorily imposed minimums on a title
insurance company's capital and surplus accounts, as well as other funds required for the
protection of the insured).
147. See id. § 1.1.2, at 1:6-:7 (discussing the social and economic factors that led to the
predominance of title insurance over earlier forms of title assurance).
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tween the title insurer and the insured property buyer and not on any
agreement between them.' 148 Some courts embracing this view have
drawn an analogy between a title insurance company and an abstractor or
attorney, viewing the title insurer's business as that of supplying informa-
tion for the guidance of others.149 This view contains three major flaws:
(1) title insurance companies are neither attorneys nor abstractors; (2)
unlike attorneys and abstractors, title insurance companies do not under-
take to provide the insured with information; and (3) the insurance serv-
ices that title insurance companies provide differ in kind from the
information reporting services that attorneys and abstractors provide.
The analogy between title insurance companies and attorneys, origi-
nally espoused in Ford and subsequently adopted by some other courts,
reflects the view that the business of title insurance, like the practice of
law, is of such overwhelming public importance that a duty to search the
public records should be implied even if the title insurance company has
not contractually undertaken such a duty. Courts that take this view con-
clude that provisions through which title insurance companies attempt to
limit their liability for negligence should be disregarded as contrary to
public policy.' 5° What this analogy overlooks, however, is that no state
authorizes title insurance companies to practice law; they cannot hold
themselves out to the public as attorneys; and they are not subject to the
ethical rules that prevent attorneys from disclaiming liability for their
own negligence.' 5 '
An even more fundamental difficulty with the Ford analogy is that, un-
like attorneys who provide title opinions, title insurance companies do
not purport to provide title information. As the court explained in
Walker Rogge:
The end result of the relationship between the title company
and the insured is the issuance of the policy. To this extent, the
relationship differs from other relationships conceivably sound-
ing in both tort and contract, such as the relationship between
148. Palomar, supra note 1, at 476-77.
149. See, e.g., Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., Inc., 553 P.2d 254, 267 (Kan.
1976) (analogizing the title insurance company's function to that of an attorney); see also
Palomar, supra note 1, at 477.
150. Bank of Cal., 826 P.2d at 1130.
151. The plaintiffs in Carstensen v. Chrisland Corp., 442 S.E.2d 660 (Va. 1994), pushed
the Ford analogy to the extreme. They argued that a title insurance company that served
as settlement agent in a real estate transaction was liable for "legal malpractice" for failing
to advise them that the lots they purchased would be subject to an easement by necessity in
favor of another lot. Id. at 668. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that "First Amer-
ican is a title insurance company, not a professional corporation qualified to render the
professional services of an attorney .... An attorney-client relationship cannot be created
by a non-attorney acting as an attorney." Id. at 669.
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physician and patient, to which plaintiff alludes. Although the
relationship between physician and patient is contractual in its
origins, the purpose of the relationship is to obtain the services
of the physician in treating the patient. The patient reasonably
expects the physician to follow the appropriate standard of care
when providing those services. By contrast, the title company is
providing not services, but a policy of insurance. That policy
appropriately limits the rights and duties of the parties. 5 '
Perhaps the most significant shortcomings of the Ford analogy are that
it disregards the historical and economic forces that caused title insurance
to supplant title opinions and abstracts as the primary method of assuring
a purchaser's title, and fails to recognize that title insurance is a funda-
mentally different system of title assurance than the systems it replaced.
Title insurance supplanted title opinions and abstracts largely because,
beginning in the 1920s and accelerating in the 1930s when the federal
government intervened in the residential mortgage market, mortgage
lenders came to insist on this form of title protection as their best hedge
against title risks. 1 53 The reasons for this insistence are evident. An at-
torney who issues an opinion of title does not agree to indemnify his cli-
ent if title is not as stated in the opinion, and the attorney's liability is
limited to cases in which the client can prove the attorney was guilty of
negligence.' 54 A title insurance company, by comparison, affords its in-
sured a no-fault contractual remedy if title is other than what the policy
states.' 55 Although most attorneys maintain professional liability insur-
ance for their own benefit, they are ill-equipped to administer or to pay
claims against themselves, and their liability insurance coverage may be
insufficient to cover a substantial claim for a title defect. Title insurance
companies, by comparison, maintain not only professional staffs to ad-
minister claims, but also the financial strength and liquidity necessary to
pay valid claims.
Mortgage lenders, particularly those that purchased mortgages on the
secondary market, began to realize that title insurance, issued by reputa-
ble insurance companies using standardized forms, granted them far
greater protection than title abstracts or attorney opinion letters. Over
the years, purchasers likewise came to rely on title insurance as the pri-
152. Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 220 (N.J. 1989).
153. BURKE, supra note 1, § 1.1.2, at 1:6 (discussing the various factors that caused
mortgage lenders increasingly to require title insurance as part of their real estate
transactions).
154. E.g., 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 257b (1980) (stating that attorneys are not
guarantors of title and are liable only for negligence or misconduct in their examinations).
155. See BURKE, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 1:2 (providing a general overview of common
features of the standard title insurance policy).
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mary means to protect themselves against the risk of title defects. The
Ford court failed to realize that market forces selected the title insurance
system over the abstract and attorney opinion letter system, that the com-
pany's no-fault contractual liability under the policy obviates the need for
any tort remedy, and that engrafting a tort remedy onto title insurance
policies is inimical to the safety and soundness of a system of insurance
protection.
The decision in Bank of California offered an alternate rationale for
recognizing the common law duty in tort, holding that title insurance
companies' expertise in title examination, their maintenance of title
"plants," and their "advertising and other practices" induces an insured
to rely on the title insurance commitment as an accurate report of title.156
Although most purchases probably do assume that a reputable title insur-
ance company will not issue a commitment for title insurance without
having first searched the public records, the other factual assertions un-
derlying Bank of California's conclusion are susceptible to challenge.157
It is not true that all title insurance companies maintain title plants; in
many instances title insurance companies issue commitments or policies
on the basis of a record search that an independent abstractor conducted.
It is also untrue that title insurance companies advertise that their com-
mitments are a "guarantee of good title";' 58 no advertisement would be
more likely to elicit immediate censorship from the companies' legal de-
partments. Furthermore, it is incongruous to contend that one title insur-
ance company's advertisement can be used to establish another
company's liability under its own commitment or policy. Perhaps even
more important, it is difficult to comprehend how a title insurance com-
pany's advertising could effectively alter its own legal documents, such as
a title insurance commitment or policy, unless the advertisement
amounted to a fraudulent inducement to purchase the title insurance
commitment or policy.
Recognizing the weaknesses in the arguments various courts articulate
for holding title insurance companies liable in tort, a leading commenta-
tor who favors the tort remedy has advanced "three policies" to support a
duty in tort: "(1) societal interests in title assurance, alienation of land,
and efficient resource allocation; (2) the equity of enforcing the expecta-
tions of the parties; and (3) the fairness that pronouncing a definite stan-
156. Bank of Cal., N.A. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Alaska
1992).
157. Id.
158. See BURKE, supra note 1, § 2.3, at 2:18-:20 (describing the industry standards for
title as "insurable" and "marketable," but not as guaranteed).
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dard affords to both the insurer and the insured."' 15 9 These policies,
which Professor Prosser might call arguments for "social engineering,"
160
do not withstand critical analysis. In fact, imposing tort liability on title
insurance companies will do little to further any societal interests, except
to provide the insured with a measure of protection beyond that which
the policy affords. This interest provides insufficient justification for en-
grafting common law principles of tort liability onto a system of insurance
protection that generally works quite well.
C. A Critique of the Public Policy Arguments for a Tort Remedy
1. A Tort Remedy Does Not Significantly Reduce the Risk of
Undiscovered Title Defects or Increase the Efficiency of
Resource Allocation
The goal of the first public policy argument in favor of a tort remedy is
to reduce the risk of undiscovered title defects. This argument assumes
that holding title insurance companies liable in tort for their title search
errors will give them an added incentive to exercise reasonable care in
conducting their searches. This stance, however, overlooks the fact that a
title insurance company already has ample incentive to perform a careful
search of the public records because the terms if the policy impose no-
fault contractual liability upon the insurer. 161 If a title insurance com-
pany fails to search the public records carefully, it exposes itself to a loss
under the title insurance policy regardless of the insured's ability to prove
negligence. An additional negligence remedy is unlikely to induce
greater diligence in public record searches because title insurance compa-
nies already must exercise a high level of care to protect themselves from
the policy's no-fault contractual liability.
159. Palomar, supra note 1, at 483 (footnotes omitted).
160. Prosser's discussion of "Social Engineering" holds that:
Perhaps more than any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a battle-
ground of social theory. Its primary purpose, of course, is to make a fair adjust-
ment of the conflicting claims of the litigating parties. But the twentieth century
has brought an increasing realization of the fact that the interests of society in
general may be involved in disputes in which the parties are private litigants ....
There is good reason, therefore, to make a conscious effort to direct the law along
lines which will achieve a desirable social result, both for the present and for the
future.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 15-16 (5th
ed. 1984).
161. In Bank of California, the court noted that although a policy of preventing future
harm would be "somewhat served" by holding the title insurance company liable in tort,
"the deterrent supplied by tort liability is not likely to be of much additional consequence
because the title company is usually liable under the title policy which ordinarily follows
the preliminary commitment." Bank of Cal., 826 P.2d at 1130.
1995]
Catholic University Law Review
The argument that society's interest in the assurance of real estate titles
militates in favor of a duty to search ignores the historical and economic
forces that led to the development of the title insurance industry. The
industry arose precisely because the negligence remedy was viewed as
inadequate. The mortgage lending industry, in recognition of the inevita-
bility of human error, manifested a distinct preference for title assurance
in the form of insurance policies issued by title insurance companies with
the financial means to pay potential claims.' 62 The societal interest in the
assurance of real estate titles therefore militates not in favor of a duty to
search, but rather, in favor of a financially sound title insurance industry
with the ability to charge reasonable premiums for the risks it assumes.
California's experience demonstrates that the tort remedy is inimical to
a financially sound title insurance industry. The negligence remedy di-
vorces the amount of risk a title insurance company assumes from the
amount of premium it collects. If tort claims are allowed, the insured
may recover all damages proximately caused by the title insurance com-
pany's negligence, even if those damages greatly exceed the policy
amount on which the title insurance company based its premium. As re-
sult of the increased risk, title insurance companies must necessarily in-
crease their loss reserves, perhaps to the point of having unfunded
liabilities, and may need to charge higher premiums to fund this increased
risk retroactively. By decreasing the predictability of losses, which pro-
vides the foundation of a safe and sound title insurance industry, a tort
remedy actually works against the societal interest of assuring real estate
titles.
Tort remedies have been notoriously ineffective in achieving the socie-
tal goal of efficient resource allocation when compared to contractual
remedies.' 63 This was particularly evident in the 1980s when legislatures
in various states replaced the tort system for compensating automobile
accident victims with no-fault insurance systems.1" Their objective was
to take premium dollars used to fund wasteful litigation and reallocate
the money back to actual compensation of injuries. Tort reform propos-
als also have led to calls for the curtailment of awards of punitive dam-
ages, which have now come under various constitutional attacks. 65
162. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
163. E.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555,613-
17 (1985) (arguing that "cost internalization" achieved through tort liability does not lead
to a more efficient allocation of resources).
164. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2101 to 2114 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
165. See, e.g., Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick
Armey, and the House Republicans to Change the Nation (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas
eds., 1994) (advocating, inter alia, an overhaul of the legal system so as to limit damage
awards in tort cases).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that punitive damages may
violate due process if juries are not given sufficient guidelines to award
them.1 66 In short, experience with using negligence systems to compen-
sate economic loss has demonstrated that they often serve only to divert
scarce resources from the socially important goals of preventing and com-
pensating losses into wasteful litigation. By contrast, the existing no-fault
insurance system has adequately assured against title defects for nearly a
century.
One of the most wasteful aspects of a tort remedy is that it often would
deprive title insurance companies of their right to correct title defects,
and thereby prevent or mitigate economic losses. Frequently, a title in-
surance company can prevent loss to itself and to its insured by seeking
appropriate legal remedies to cure a title defect. However, in jurisdic-
tions that afford the insured a tort remedy, the insured may bring a tort
action against the title insurance company immediately upon discovering
a title defect, thereby frustrating the title insurance company's contrac-
tual right to cure the title defect and assuring that an economic loss will
occur. The tort remedy thus fosters wasteful litigation rather than prob-
lem solving and loss reduction.
To supply one example from the author's own experience, a bank, upon
learning of a title defect in the security for its mortgage loan, filed an
immediate arbitration demand against its title insurance company. The
bank commenced this action, which sought full payment of the bank's
mortgage loan, even though the title insurance company, at its own ex-
pense, could easily have removed the title defect - a prior lien - by
litigation. The title insurance company thus became engaged in a two-
front conflict: defending arbitration its insured instituted to obtain imme-
diate payment under the policy, while at the same time prosecuting a suit
on behalf of its insured to cure the title defect. Fortunately for the com-
pany, it succeeded in curing the title defect prior to the arbitration hear-
ing, rendering the arbitration moot. Nevertheless, this case illustrates two
inefficiencies in resource allocation that will occur if courts deprive title
insurance companies of their contractual right to mitigate damages. Liti-
gation to cure title defects always requires the insured's cooperation,
which may range from the insured simply giving the insurer permission to
sue in its name to providing extensive assistance in developing the facts
the insurer needs to try the case. In this example, the bank's premature
arbitration demand not only caused an unnecessary and costly dispute
166. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2722-23 (1993)
(plurality opinion) (concluding that "grossly excessive" punitive damages could violate the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law).
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between itself and the company, but also produced tensions that inhibited
cooperation between them in curing the title problem.
2. A Tort Remedy Does Not Fulfill the Parties' Expectations
The second public policy argument in favor of a tort remedy for undis-
closed title defects presupposes that the tort remedy fulfills the expecta-
tions of the parties. In addition to the points this Article previously
raised while discussing whether a title insurance company has an implied
contractual duty to search public records, 67 several additional observa-
tions serve to undermine the efficacy of this public policy argument.
Each of the opposing lines of authority recognizes that insureds expect
a title insurance company to conduct a reasonable search of the public
records prior to issuing a title insurance commitment or policy. 168 This
recognition of expectations does not, however, mandate the imposition of
a tort duty upon the insurer. An additional, decisive question must be
asked - whether the insured has a reasonable expectation of any remedy
or recourse beyond those the policy sets forth. Based on the language of
the title commitment and policy, the answer to this question is no. As the
courts held in Walker Rogge and Southland Title Corp., although the in-
sured may expect the title insurance company to examine the title, the
insured is bargaining for the certainty of a contract remedy under the
policy, and not for the uncertainty of a remedy in tort.
169
Similarly, from the title insurance company's perspective, imposing an
additional remedy in tort would be contrary to the expectations of the
contracting parties because it might give the insured an unjust windfall
167. See supra part III.A (discussing the implied contract theory).
168. E.g., Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 220 (N.J.
1989) (stating that "[a]lthough we recognize that an insured expects that a title company
will conduct a reasonable title examination, the relationship between the company and the
insured is essentially contractual").
169. See, e.g., Real Estate Title Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C.
Cir. 1947). In Real Estate Title, the court determined that for corporate taxation purposes,
title insurance companies are in the business of insurance and not the business of supplying
information. Specifically, the court stated:
[F]or more than half a century the general understanding of petitioners, the bar,
and the public has been that each of the policies issued by petitioners creates a
limited liability payable to the holder upon the breach of its conditions. It is not
their work as title examiners that petitioners insure. What they do certify is that
the title to the property involved is good and marketable and their liability is
conditioned upon the breach of this certification. This by every token is insurance
and nothing else. It would be a shock to the thousands of present policyholders
of these companies to be told that all of this is untrue and that petitioners' liabil-




for which neither party had bargained. As the court noted in Southland
Title Corp., a title insurance company's business is simply to insure ti-
tle.' 7° It derives its income from policy premiums, which are based on the
amount of liability that the company assumes under its policy. Armed
with a negligence remedy, the insured might recover damages well in ex-
cess of the policy amount, which formed the basis of his premium. 171 The
insured also might recover damages wholly outside the contemplation of
the insurance contract. This is exactly what happened for a time in Cali-
fornia. Until California adopted remedial legislation, a judicially created
negligence remedy' 72 allowed the insured to recover damages for emo-
tional distress and allowed the jury to consider awarding punitive
damages.
173
3. A Tort Remedy Does Not Provide a More Definite Standard of
Liability than the Contractual Standard Provided by Title
Insurance Policies
The third public policy argument for a tort remedy, the supposed in-
crease in clarity of standards, rests on the wholly unwarranted assumption
that the standards to be applied in a tort action have greater clarity than
the standards to be applied in a contract action.
In a contract action, the court may determine the title insurance com-
pany's obligations from the plain meaning of the policy. Under the
widely-used ALTA policy forms, these obligations are quite clear. If the
insured's title is challenged, the insurance company must provide a de-
fense, and if a loss occurs, the company must indemnify the insured in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the title insurance policy.
174
By contrast, in a tort action, the title insurance company's liability will
depend on proof that the defect could have been ascertained from a rea-
170. 282 Cal. Rptr. 425,430 (Cal. Ct. App.), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4321 (Cal.
1991).
171. See Walker Rogge, 562 A.2d at 220 (recognizing the availability of consequential
damages under tort liability).
172. In Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975),
the court held that a title insurance company's liability for negligence was not limited to
the amount of the policy, and included damages for the insured's emotional distress. Id. at
486. The California legislature reversed Jarchow in 1981 by enacting a statute providing
that neither a commitment for title insurance nor a policy shall be construed as a represen-
tation of the state of title to real estate. CAL. INS. CODE § 12340.11 (West 1988); see also
Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 237 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (distin-
guishing between the viability of the tort remedy before and after amendment of the
statute).
173. See, e.g., Jarchow, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 476. Though punitive damages were not
awarded by the Jarchow jury, the matter was submitted for their deliberation.
174. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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sonable search of the public records. This inquiry is a question of fact, to
be decided by the jury rather than by the court, often based on conflicting
expert testimony as to whether the title insurance company exercised or-
dinary care according to community standards. 175 If liability is estab-
lished, the amount will depend not on the policy terms, but rather on the
jury's determination of what damages were within the foreseeable con-
templation of the parties. The jury will make this determination without
the guidance of the policy, without regard to the amount of insurance
purchased, and with the possibility of an award of punitive damages, the
amount of which is discretionary. Thus, the public policy interest in favor
of clarity of standards weighs strongly in opposition to imposing a tort
remedy.
IV. CONCLUSION
None of the public policy arguments for imposing tort liability is so
compelling as to justify departure from the general rule that an insurance
company's obligation to its insured is governed by the policy contract.
Although title insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, so too are
most other insurance policies, as well as other important consumer con-
tracts, such as mortgage loan documents. More important, the standard
policy forms provide practical benefits far beyond any protection that an
owner or mortgage lender could ever obtain through a title abstract or an
attorney opinion. It is for this very reason that title insurance now has
supplanted these other devices to protect against the risk of title defects.
Although the title insurance company's liability under the policy is lim-
ited to the amount of insurance purchased, this limitation is neither unfair
to the policy holder, nor is it a bargain that a court should describe as
unconscionable.
In areas outside real estate, experience teaches that tort remedies are
an inefficient means of compensating accidental injuries. This is illus-
trated by the many efforts at tort reform in automobile accident and med-
ical malpractice cases. Indeed, a reform frequently suggested in these
cases is to replace the fault-based tort remedy with no-fault insurance. 76
Within the realm of real estate, title insurance already has supplanted the
175. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. Under a tort theory, the standard
of care incumbent on the title insurance company would presumably be analogous to that
imposed on an attorney.
176. E.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, A Draft Bill to Allow Choice Between No-Fault and Fault-
Based Auto Insurance, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 144-45 (1990) (arguing that "no-fault is
more effective than the tort system in dealing with auto accident claims," but advocating a
consumer option to purchase fault-based insurance).
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older, fault-based remedies that a purchaser or mortgage lender had
against a title attorney or abstractor.
From a historical perspective, Jarchow and similar cases represent tort
reform in reverse. Deciding on public policy grounds that an insured's
no-fault remedy under a title insurance policy is inadequate, these cases
permit the insured to recover in tort. This remedy imposes upon insur-
ance companies duties they did not undertake; confers upon insureds
benefits for which they did not bargain; and superimposes on an efficient
insurance remedy the inefficient, uncertain, and anachronistic remedies
that apply most appropriately to forms of title protection long out of
favor in the real estate market.
In reversing Jarchow, the California legislature displayed prudent rec-
ognition of the harmful consequence that might flow from the imposition
of a tort remedy. The California statute and the contract-view cases, such
as Walker Rogge, are not anti-consumer; they merely follow the familiar
principle that courts should enforce insurance contracts as written unless
the transaction is so unfair that enforcement would be unconscionable.
Absent an unconscionable bargain - which is not present in title insur-
ance policies - there is no justification for courts to engraft a tort rem-
edy onto a fundamentally reasonable insurance system for managing the
risk of title defects.
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